



# FMEA/CIL 201

RAMS TRAINING SUMMIT

PAUL BRITTON NASA

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RYAN DETERS BASTION TECHNOLOGIES

# FMEA/CIL SKILLS

- Who will be good at FMEA?
  - Analytical, Methodical, Skeptical, Imaginative

# FMEA/CIL SCOPE

- FMEA/CIL is a powerful design-analysis tool (and communication tool)
- What are the reliability and safety expectations?
  - Risk understanding and acceptance
  - Design influence
- FMEA is bottoms-up. Where is the bottom? Where is the top?
  - What should be the boundaries of the analysis?
  - Initial Criticality Assessment
- Are there down stream requirements that depend on FMEA/CIL results?


# TERMINOLOGY



The FMEA intends to identify all failure modes at the **bottom level** and to categorize the worst-case severity of the **end effect** by determining the worst-case **Criticality** of each failure mode.

The **bottom**. Example 1: **hardware level** = individual components or circuit paths. Example 2: **functional level** = LRU or box level. The intent is to drive reliability and safety into the architecture, testing, operations and detailed design as earlier as possible.

# MORE TERMINOLOGY




# FMEA/CIL USE-CASES

- Criticality can help inform risk-based decisions
- Design influence
- Test and Inspection influence
- Support down-stream analysis and requirements

# CIL WORKSHEET FIELDS

- Prepared by Information
- Hardware Information
  - Item Name, Part Number, Schematic ID, System Location, etc
- Item Function Description
- Failure Mode
- Failure Causes
- End Failure Effect by Phase or Operational Mode
- Worst Case Criticality
- Failure Detection
  - Failure Detection, Software Response, Corrective Action
- Retention Rational
  - Design, Test, Inspection, Failure History
- References
  - Operational Requirements, Hazard Reports, Supplier FMEA, Other related databases





# QUESTIONS



# CRITICALITY DEFINITIONS

## Criticality Definition

- 1** Failure that could result in loss of life or vehicle
- 1S** Failure in safety or hazard monitoring system that could prevent system from detecting a hazardous condition or fail to operate during such condition
- 1R** Redundant hardware that, if all failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
- 3** Failure that could cause degradation to mission objectives

# CIL RETENTION RATIONALE

Retention rationale consists of controls to minimize the risk associated with the critical item

- Design
  - Manufacturing controls, safety factors, unique physical characteristics
- Tests
  - Identify specific tests performed that would detect presence of failure
- Inspections
  - Identify specific Inspections performed that would detect presence of failure
- Failure History
  - Summary of all previous occurrences and actions taken
- Operational Use
  - Description of operations to mitigate or limit effect
    - Malfunction Procedures, Operating Constraints, Crew Training

# FMEA EXAMPLE

| <b>Worksheet #:</b> CCC-ELE-SYS-ASSEM-PART-###  |                   | <b>System:</b> Element X         |  | <b>Reliability Eng.:</b> Peter     |                               |                          |
|---|-------------------|----------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Rev:</b> G   |                   | <b>Subsystem:</b> System M       |  | <b>Reliability Mgr.:</b> Paul      |                               |                          |
| <b>Date Modified:</b> 4/9/1920  |                   | <b>Design Eng.:</b> Fred         |  | <b>Integrated Rel. Eng.:</b> Peter |                               |                          |
| <b>Failure Mode:</b> Leakage - External   |                   | <b>Design Mgr.:</b> Sally        |  | <b>Integrated Rel. Mgr.:</b> Paul  |                               |                          |
| PART INFORMATION  |                   |                                  |  |                                    |                               |                          |
| 1   | <b>LRU Name:</b>  | Fill/Drain Line, System, Element | <b>Dwg Nbr:</b>  | 201-#####, Rev -                   | <b>Supplier Item Name:</b>    | Fill-Drain Duct Assembly |
|   | <b>LRU Nbr:</b>   | 201-#####-#                      | <b>Dwg Find Nbr:</b>   | 2                                  | <b>Supplier Item Nbr:</b>     | #####-101                |
|   | <b>Item Name:</b> | Fill/Drain Line, System, Element | <b>Dwg Qty:</b>  | 1                                  | <b>Supplier Dwg Nbr:</b>      | #####-101, Rev -         |
|   | <b>Item Nbr:</b>  | 201-#####-#                      | <b>Schematic Nbr:</b>  | 201-#####, Rev -                   | <b>Supplier Dwg Find Nbr:</b> | N/A                      |
| <b>LCN:</b>   | N/A               | <b>Schematic ID:</b>             | AA-B#  | <b>Supplier Name:</b>              | ABCDEFGH Inc                  |                          |
| ITEM FUNCTION & FAILURE CAUSES  |                   |                                  |  |                                    |                               |                          |
| <b>Item Function:</b><br>The fill/drain line is an XYZ-### Inconel line that spans between the fill/drain disconnect and the fill/drain valve. The line is insulated. The line includes flexible joints that allow for limited movement of the line. The line includes a pressure and temperature port near the fill/drain valve interface. This worksheet analyzes the line fails by external leakage. |                   |                                  | <b>Failure Causes:</b><br><ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Defective sealing surfaces on the flange</li> <li>2. Failure of tube/bellows weld</li> <li>3. Failure of bellows longitudinal weld</li> <li>4. Initial crack in tube propagates due to cyclic loading</li> <li>5. Excessive vibration</li> <li>6. Improper installation (bolt torqueing)</li> <li>7. Mishandling</li> <li>8. TPS pressure collapse resulting in excessive structural loads</li> <li>9. Excessive interface forces/moments at the Fill/Drain Valve</li> <li>10. Excessive interface forces/moments at the Quick Disconnect</li> <li>11. Excessive interface forces/moments at the vehicle attachment points</li> <li>12. Excessive flange deflection</li> <li>13. Fatigue failure of instrumentation boss</li> <li>14. Deformation due to cyclic loading</li> <li>15. Damage to line induced by small line support loads</li> </ol> |                                    |                               |                          |